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 China and Humanitarian 
Aid Cooperation
China’s international humanitarian aid role is increasing. Widely 
welcomed by recipients, China’s aid is also criticised on motivational 
and technical grounds and surrounded by intensifying political 
scrutiny. There is an urgent need to ensure that humanitarian 
cooperation with China is not derailed politically, weakening support 
for developing economies when they are most in need. Constructive 
international policy dialogue and knowledge exchange between 
China and the international community is crucial to re-evaluating 
and strengthening humanitarian coordination and effectiveness.


















– There is a need for better international humanitarian aid (IHA) 
governance. Covid-19 demonstrates the need for more effective IHA 
and emergency response mechanisms.
– The IHA system is at a critical juncture. Political scrutiny of China has 
intensified, threatening cooperation. Dialogue is urgently needed to 
keep politics out of, and China in, IHA reform.
– China’s IHA approach is different. China’s international humanitarian 
aid (CHA) policy is part of a holistic development approach.
– Much of China’s humanitarian aid is provided bilaterally. Offered 
case-by-case, it attracts criticism that CHA is driven by strategic 
interests.
– CHA policy governance has been reformed. China’s ‘people-centred 
philosophy of development’ and its new International Development 
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) aim to streamline policymaking and 
raise the status of international development policy. A step in the right 
direction, it will take time to bed-in and to assess its effectiveness.
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China’s humanitarian aid
China has committed to multilateral agreements 
and processes of humanitarian governance 
and embraces the principles of humanitarian 
assistance, such as humanism, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence. Nonetheless, 
questions arise as to the extent of China’s 
conformity to existing global norms and 
conventions. For some, China’s approach to 
humanitarian aid risks undermining decades 
of effort in building international consensus. 
Others see the approach as a long overdue 
shake-up of the system: a ‘positive disruption’. 
This debate follows from the distinctive 
nature of China’s humanitarian aid. CHA 
policies are situated within a ‘holistic’ portfolio 
of international sustainable economic growth 
and development, rather than a standalone 
policy pathway; humanitarian aid policy is 
more reactive and ad hoc than strategic; CHA 
expenditure varies year-to-year depending on 
the specific crisis in hand; and this reflects the 
case-by-case, pragmatic assessment rather 
than a systematic, comprehensive policy and 
forward response programme. The CHA year-
by-year profile provision is, consequently, 
highly episodic. People-to-people relations 
play an increasingly prominent role in China’s 
official discourse. Many of China’s semi-civil 
organisations remain networked to long-
established Chinese communities across 
developing countries. These networks were 
effectively leveraged at the start of the 
Covid-19 pandemic to acquire urgently 
needed personal protective equipment (PPE) 
supplies, initially for China itself, and later to 
distribute CHA in developing countries. More 
broadly, future ‘people-to-people’ 
cooperation can be strengthened if concerns 
raised over the potential for a ‘securitisation’ of 
IHA knowledge-sharing relationships, including 
relations involving China and the international 
community, are addressed.
China’s Covid-19 humanitarian aid
China’s Covid-19 aid has included medical 
supplies, equipment, and personnel; 
financial assistance; and knowledge-sharing 
to over 150 countries and international 
organisations. In May 2020, President Xi’s 
address to the World Health Assembly made 
five commitments on Covid-19 cooperation; 
namely, China would:
1. Provide US$2bn for a two-year period 
to support the Covid-19 response and 
economic and social development in 
developing countries.
2. Cooperate with the United Nations (UN) 
to set up a global humanitarian response 
depot and hub based in China; ensure the 
operation of anti-epidemic supply chains; 
and foster ‘green corridors’ for fast-track 
transportation and customs clearance.
3. Increase capacity-building in Africa, by 
establishing a process for Chinese hospitals 
to partner and cooperate with 30 African 
hospitals, and by speeding-up construction 
of the China-funded US$2m Africa Centres 
for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa 
CDC) headquarters to strengthen Africa’s 
disease preparedness and control.
4. Ensure vaccine accessibility and affordability 
in developing countries by making Covid-19 
vaccine development and deployment in 
China, when available, ‘a global public good’. 
5. Collaborate with other G20 members to 
implement the Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative (DSSI) for the poorest countries. 
Confirming these commitments and seeking 
to counter criticisms, the Chinese government 
issued a White Paper in June 2020. The paper 
sought to: (1) defend China’s crisis response 
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against criticisms, (2) argue that the emergency 
system it implemented provides a model for 
other countries, and (3) detail its international 
cooperation and CHA. Despite these 
statements, the Chinese government faces 
questions over the origins of the pandemic, 
securitisation of the initial official response in 
Wuhan, transparency, and accountability.
Political scrutiny of China is creating 
international tensions. Potentially, these 
tensions can spillover adversely into IHA 
governance. China plays an increasingly 
important role in the multilateral system. 
However, cooperation with, and cooperation 
by, China may be compromised by political 
disputes over trade, Hong Kong, Huawei 5G, 
WeChat, the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and calls by some Western politicians 
for a post-crisis ‘reckoning’ with China and 
international investigation into the pandemic’s 
origins. Substantial political work and 
responsible leadership are needed on all sides 
through meaningful dialogue to minimise 
adverse spillover into IHA cooperation.
A note on China’s humanitarian aid 
to Africa
China has a long history of providing 
humanitarian aid to Africa. In recent years, it 
has contributed: US$3m in 2018 to assist those 
displaced in Cameroon’s civil war; rice food aid 
to Yemen through 2019; and US$800,000 to 
Zimbabwe’s 2019 Cyclone Idai disaster relief. It is 
reactive, ad hoc, and case-by-case, and would 
be strengthened by a clear, systemic statement 
and strategy on its humanitarian aid policy to 
Africa, building on and contextualising its Forum 
on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and 
building on its Covid-19 commitments as well 
as its evolving Africa Policy.
– CHA to Africa increasingly leverages 
‘people-to-people’ civil society 
organisations. Chinese charities, long-
established Chinese diasporas, and 
community networks have been utilised to 
an unprecedented degree during Covid-19. 
‘Philanthropic’ foundations, such as the 
Jack Ma Foundation, provided substantial 
trenches of PPE to African states.
– China’s aid to Africa is channelled bilaterally 
but framed multilaterally. China works 
through the FOCAC, the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa], the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the African Union, and 
Multilateral Development Banks.
– Debt relief. China prefers to provide loans 
rather than grants. New loan data gathered 
by SAIS-CARI indicates that China 
accounted for 22 per cent of Africa’s public 
debt stock in 2018 and 29 per cent of debt 
service in low-income African economies 
in 2020. The findings show that China is a 
small lender in over half of the 22 African 
countries that are facing debt distress. In 
seven of these countries, China accounts 
for 25 per cent or more of all public and 
publicly guaranteed debt. Given this, 
China’s debt relief is relatively small, whilst 
expectations are high. Under the G20 DSSI, 
China agreed to suspend Chinese zero-
interest loan repayments from May 2020. 
Some 38 African economies are eligible for 
DSSI and, pressed by African leaders for 
stronger action, China announced in June 
2020 that it would cancel zero-interest 
loans due to mature by the end of 2020 
for ‘relevant’ African economies. This was 
criticised for ‘fuelling Africa’s debt’. However, 
SAIS-CARI notes that it targets only a small 
fraction of China’s loans between 2000 and 
2018 – around 5 per cent. Given that around 
half of China’s loans are concessional or 
commercial, any restructuring negotiations 
are likely to be tough and protracted.
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Policy recommendations 
– Strengthen international dialogue and 
development cooperation. The pressing 
policy need is for focused international 
dialogue to minimise spillover from wider 
political tensions and to strengthen future 
humanitarian aid cooperation. The G20, 
with its more flexible policy space and its 
multi-sector participation, should take a 
lead in facilitating this dialogue.
– Humanitarian aid dialogue must tackle 
political issues constructively. Dealing 
with issues specifically relevant to 
humanitarian aid cooperation is critical. 
This will be tough going: the politics of 
IHA remain. Major issues are not easily 
separable from the wider context; 
for example, US–China differences over 
WHO are interwoven with domestic 
election politics in the US and leadership 
standing in China, whilst humanitarian 
debt relief is embedded in issues of 
global and regional political economy 
and strategic interests.
– Improve data-sharing and transparency. 
Dialogue and coordination would be 
strengthened further by all parties 
contributing full data on their global 
humanitarian aid. This should build on: 
the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs’ Financial Tracking 
Service; commitments made at the 
2016 World Humanitarian Summit; the 
International Aid Transparency Initiative 
common standard for publishing data 
on humanitarian funding; and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development-Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) 
Creditor Reporting System. 
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